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experiment, based on the Accountable Capitalism Act and Delaware 
corporate law, with human participants acting as three different types of 
directors: shareholder-selected directors, employee-selected directors, plus 
a third, novel form of director, “environment-selected directors.” In this 
paper, we integrate quantitative and qualitative findings from this experiment 
to provide novel results about the behaviors of these participants, and the 
deeper motivations underlying their behaviors. We found a range of potential 
motivations that could affect directors’ behavior, including obeying 
regulations, being responsive to changes unfolding in the world, feelings of 
obligation to the stakeholders that selected them, and pre-existing biases 
toward or against particular stakeholders. We also found a strong penchant 
on the part of directors to engage in balancing of interests, even when 
instructed to favor only one interest, suggesting tension between existing 
corporate law and the preferences of individual directors. By providing 
experimental evidence into the motivations that may influence such directors’ 
behaviors, and in particular exploring the possibility of environment-selected 
directors, this paper seeks to lay the legal groundwork for broader 
stakeholder representation on corporate boards. 
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Corporations have a great deal of power in human civilizations. They 
control vast flows of resources, determine how billions of people live their 
lives, produce profound impacts on society and the environment, and exert 
substantial influence on law and policy. 
The directors of corporations are responsible for directing the 
behavior of those corporations. As such, corporate directors are 
correspondingly powerful. 
Understanding how corporate directors make decisions, and what 
factors influence their choices, is therefore exceedingly important. However, 
getting access to the motivations influencing their decisions is challenging. 
Corporate directors are in positions of power, and therefore may not feel the 
need to disclose their motivations. They may be unwilling to acknowledge 
the rationales for their own behavior. Or their motivations may involve 
corporate secrets.  
Understanding the behavior of corporate directors is particularly 
difficult in the context of laws that have not yet been passed. When no 
directors have operated under a particular legal framework, how can one have 
evidence for how such directors may act? While laws may seek to affect 
corporate behavior, exactly how they will do so remains difficult to ascertain. 
To provide some purchase on these difficult issues, we created an 
interactive online business simulation and recruited 400 human participants 
to act as corporate directors setting the direction for simulated corporations.1 
 
1 This article is one in a series of articles produced using this simulation framework. While 
each of these articles shares text describing the implementation and evaluation framework, 
the key findings presented here, relating to director motivations and rigorous analysis of 
qualitative findings from this study, are novel and have not been published previously.  
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One hundred of these participants were told that they were operating under a 
summary of Delaware corporate law—a common legal framework for U.S. 
corporations. The remaining 300 were instructed via a summary of the 
Accountable Capitalism Act, a piece of legislation currently under 
consideration by the U.S. Congress. Of these 300, 100 were told that they had 
been selected by shareholders—the default way that directors are selected 
under Delaware corporate law, and the way that up to 60% of directors would 
be selected under the Accountable Capitalism Act. An additional 100 were 
told they had been selected by employees, the way that at least 40% of 
directors would be selected under the Accountable Capitalism Act. The final 
100 were told they had been selected by a committee of scientists who study 
the environment. These so-called “environment-selected directors” represent 
a way of selecting directors that is not present in any extant or proposed 
legislation but one that previous work has suggested could be effective at 
broadening stakeholder representation on corporate boards.2 
In this Article we present novel findings from the interactive 
simulation, integrating previously published quantitative results with novel 
qualitative results to shed new light on the behavior of corporate directors 
under existing, proposed, and hypothetical legislation. Whereas previously 
published work has identified how such directors may act,3 here we go into 
depth on why they act in those ways. These results are especially powerful 
because, as mentioned earlier, getting access to the motivations of corporate 
directors under existing legislation is challenging at best, and getting access 
to director motivations under proposed or hypothetical legislation is 
effectively impossible outside of an experimental simulation context. This 
simulation system provides one of the first experimental platforms for 
interrogating how directors would behave under novel forms of legislation. 
In this Article, we synthesize previous quantitative findings with a 
rigorous qualitative analysis of free-text responses by all 400 participants 
across the four experimental conditions to identify the range of motivations 
influencing participants’ behavior. Specifically, we found that the following 
factors were most prominent in the behavior of multiple participants:  
● a desire for balance across various stakeholder groups,  
● pre-existing biases toward or against particular stakeholders,  
 
2 Bill Tomlinson et al., “Environment-Selected Directors”: An Interactive Simulation Experiment 
of Environmental Representation on Corporate Boards, 178 ECOLOGICAL ECON., no. 106795, 
2020, at 5–6, 8 (2020). 
3 Id. at 5–6; Bill Tomlinson et al., A Participatory Simulation of the Accountable Capitalism 
Act, CHI '20: PROC. 2020 CHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS., Apr. 2020, at 2, 
5, 7 [hereinafter Tomlinson et al., Participatory Simulation]; Bill Tomlinson et al., 
Accountability with a Capital “Ism”: A Computational Simulation of the Accountable 
Capitalism Act vs. Delaware Corporate Law. 17 OHIO ST. TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2020-
21) [hereinafter Tomlinson et al., Accountability]. 




● a desire to be responsive to changes unfolding in the business world,  
● feelings of obligation to the stakeholders that selected them, and 
● an obedience to the law under which they were operating. 
Different configurations of legislation and director selection 
mechanism led to different frequencies of particular motivations. For 
example, shareholder-selected directors under the Accountable Capitalism 
Act mentioned “balance” and related concepts significantly more frequently 
than shareholder-selected directors did under Delaware corporate law 
(p=0.0168*), while shareholder-selected Delaware directors mentioned the law 
or rules significantly more than shareholder-selected Accountable Capitalism 
Act directors did (p=0.00094**). Perhaps most salient is that only a subset of 
these motivations is responsive to legislation, while other motivations may be 
directly at odds with the goals of particular legislation (e.g., pre-existing biases). 
In addition, some aspects of legislation (e.g., who selects a director) create 
effects beyond those explicitly stated in the legislation (e.g., feelings of 
obligation to the stakeholder group that selected them). 
In sum, the motivations of corporate directors are difficult to 
ascertain, but exceedingly important to the way human civilizations operate. 
Legislation is designed to affect these motivations, but only impacts a subset 
of them, and impacts them in ways that may not always be explicit or obvious. 
We present the first instance of experimental investigation into the 
motivations of directors operating under proposed and hypothetical future 
legislation. As such, this article offers a significant contribution to legal 
scholarship, and to the ways in which the law influences the future behavior 
of human civilizations. 
 
I. RELATED WORK 
 
In most cases, a group of executive officers manages a corporation. 
This group takes the form of a Board of Directors unless planned otherwise 
in the corporation’s charter. The board possesses the ultimate managerial 
authority, which is inherent in the statute.4 
 
A. The Traditional Shareholder Primacy Norm 
 
Traditionally, corporate directors in many legal frameworks are 
accountable to the company’s shareholders. Under Delaware corporate law, 
the default rule is that shareholders elect directors by a plurality of the votes 
 
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2020) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). 
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of shares.5 Such voting rights are protected by law, where a director acting 
with the primary purpose of preventing or impeding the exercise of 
stockholder voting power is forbidden.6 Shareholders may also remove 
directors, with or without cause.7  
In general, directors ought only to be motivated by shareholders’ 
interests. By law, each director has a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of 
their company.8 For example, the Delaware Supreme Court once found that 
directors’ fiduciary duty requires that the directors not act in ways that are 
intentionally designed to not maximize the economic value of a corporation for 
the benefit of the shareholders.9 It is also a violation of the fiduciary duty to 
implement a plan that would limit future corporate policy from maximizing 
profitability.10 Due to this regulation of fiduciary duty, directors are obligated 
by law to operate a corporation to maximize the interest of shareholders.  
Despite the legally compelling fiduciary duty imposed upon directors, 
Jill E. Fisch has argued that the limited scope of this duty claim “provides a 
mechanism for institutional specialization in responding to the needs of 
different corporate stakeholders.”11 Fisch criticized the approach taken by most 
empirical researchers; this approach is based on the presumption of shareholder 
primacy norm and neglects other stakeholders “whose interests in the firm may 
not be reflected in an assessment of shareholder value . . . .”12 She warned that 
such flawed assumptions, relied upon in many empirical studies, counsel 
against allowing shareholder wealth effects to dominate regulatory policy.13  
In addition to fiduciary duty, corporate law specifically created 
“corporate opportunity doctrine” to address the scenario in which a director’s 
 
5 Id. § 216(3) (“Directors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person 
or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors . . . .”). 
6 See, e.g., Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 652 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that 
even when directors act unselfishly based on an honest understanding of the corporation’s best 
interest, they may not act “for the primary purpose of preventing or impeding an unaffiliated 
majority of shareholders from expanding the board and electing a new majority.”). 
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2020) (“Any director or the entire board may be removed, 
with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an 
election of directors,” with certain exceptions). 
8 See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 26 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“All 
directors of Delaware corporations are fiduciaries of the corporations’ stockholders.”). 
9 See id. at 29–30 (emphasizing that “rights plans” can be used “inappropriately to benefit 
incumbent managers and directors at the stockholders’ expense,” and that such abuses may 
properly be the subject of shareholder-initiated litigation). 
10 Id. at 35 (“Directors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a rights plan to 
defend a business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization—at least 
not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law.”). 
11 Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 
31 J. CORP. L. 637, 638 (2006). 
12 Id.  
13 Id. 




interest is in conflict with that of the company of which she is a director.14 A 
director may not personally take a business opportunity if the company of 
which she is director is willing and able to exploit this opportunity.15 This 
rule effectively limits directors from acting with the motivation of self-benefit 
in the context of directorship.  
Furthermore, corporate law itself holds a director’s work performance 
to a high ethical level. Indeed, a director has a duty of care “to perform his or 
her functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to 
be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily 
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position 
and under similar circumstances.”16 This duty of care in the corporate context 
is commonly referred to as the “Business Judgment Rule.” Although the 
Business Judgment Rule does impose ethical obligations on corporate 
directors, it also allows considerable discretion on the parts of directors. 
Under the Business Judgment Rule a director is only personally liable if she 
engages in gross negligence in her role as director.17 
Although it is possible, in theory, for directors to be motivated by 
interests other than those of shareholders, there are regulations in place to 
restrict such a temptation. For example, when a company is up for sale, 
directors may consider non-shareholder interests only if there is a rationally 
relevant benefit to shareholders.18 Directors’ decisions may act in a way that 
benefits other stakeholders when it is reasonable to believe that shareholders 
will be benefited in the long term. For example, the directors of Time 
magazine were once permitted to preserve Time’s culture of journalistic 
integrity because the Court believed such integrity would likely help in the 
long term to maximize shareholder value.19 Generally, shareholders have 
broad discretion to authorize the board of directors to account for ethical or 
 
14 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510–11 (Del. Ch. 1939). 
15 See, e.g., id. (noting that the corporate opportunity rule allows corporate officers or 
directors to pursue individual opportunities in which the corporation has no vested interest 
but prohibits pursuit of opportunities in the line of the corporation’s business and “in which 
the corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy . . . .”).  
16 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2018). 
17 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. 
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) (noting that that a “gross negligence” standard applies when 
assessing fault in either a director’s duty of care or a board of directors’ business judgment). 
18 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (“[W]hile 
concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when addressing a takeover threat, 
that principle is limited by the requirement that there be some rationally related benefit 
accruing to the stockholders.”). 
19 Paramount Commc’ns v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989) (finding that Time 
executives and directors were committed to “seeing to the preservation of Time’s ‘culture,’ 
i.e., its perceived editorial integrity in journalism,” and thereby were acting in the 
corporation’s best interests).  
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philanthropic considerations.20 Some scholars believe that directors are already 
motivated by the interest of other stakeholders. For example, William J. Carney 
famously argued that the pre-existing contract formation and post-contractual 
performance with a company’s stakeholders already “serve[d] constituencies 
well21”, and that “in well-run corporations little would change if constituency 
representation were added.22” Carney concluded that “constituency 
representation would lead to only trivial differences in corporate behavior.23” 
 
B. Stakeholder Theory and Constituency Statutes 
 
Traditionally, the shareholder primacy norm where directors are 
motivated primarily by shareholders’ interests is dominant.24 Debates have 
swirled around the intersection of corporate social responsibility and the law 
for decades; the proposed Accountable Capitalism Act investigated here is 
only one of the most recent substantial moves in these debates. Yet over the 
decades, courts have incrementally given directors more leeway to take into 
account stakeholders’ interests beyond those of the shareholders. For 
example, in A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court upheld a statute that allowed directors to make charitable 
giving on behalf of the company.25 This case coincides with the rising 
corporate social responsibility doctrine and the implementation of 
constituency statutes. As early as 1991, Katherine Van Wezel Stone stated 
 
20 See Rebecca E. Wolitz, A Corporate Duty to Rescue: Biopharmaceutical Companies and 
Access to Medications, 94 IND. L.J. 1163, 1181 (2019) (noting that “corporations have the 
discretion to attend to moral obligations” regardless of whether that attention produces 
corporate profit or shareholder gain); Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 583 (2006) (“[T]here is no doubt that 
shareholder proposals on social responsibility grounds are permissible.”; Anthony J. 
Fejfar, Corporate Voluntarism: Panacea or Plague? A Question of Horizon, 17 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 859, 938 (1992) (recommending adoption of corporate responsibility principles that 
account not only for profit production but also for ethical and social concerns).  
21 William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 CIN. L. REV. 385, 389 (1990). 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 See supra Section I.A; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2020) (mandating that 
while “discharging the[ir] duties” in the “best interests of the corporation,” directors are 
obligated to consider the effects of their actions on “the corporation or its shareholders.”). 
25 See A.P. Smith Mfg. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953) (sanctioning the “validity 
of the donation by the plaintiff” directors as “a lawful exercise of the corporation’s implied 
and incidental powers under common-law principles” that “came within the express authority 
of the pertinent state legislation.”). 




that the constituency statutes over the past few decades created fiduciary 
duties for directors to stakeholders other than shareholders.26  
The debate between stakeholder theory and shareholder primacy 
theory is not new to legal scholars. Stephen M. Bainbridge noted the long-
time debates around corporate social responsibility dating back to the 
1930s.27 Bainbridge summarized the contention between Professors Adolf 
Berle and Merrick Dodd, where the former believed the directors should 
“operate the corporation for the sole benefit of the shareholders,”28 whereas 
the latter “saw shareholders as absentee owners whose interests can be 
subjugated to those of other corporate constituencies and those of society at 
large.”29 Bainbridge further explained how this debate coincides with the rise 
of nonshareholder constituency statutes.30 These state statutes permit 
directors to consider stakeholders’ interests31, which gives leeway for 
directors’ broad motivations. In his article, Bainbridge proposes a new model 
to mitigate the tension between the two schools of opinion.32 Under his 
proposal, directors are allowed to consider nonshareholder stakeholders’ 
interests, but only in making operational decisions, not structural ones.33 
Andrew Keay also analyzed this issue.34 After comparing and 
evaluating the arguments in support of and against stakeholder theory, he 
concluded that stakeholders should be ends instead of means in the course 
of corporate governance.35 Keay pointed out that this issue ultimately turns 
on the trustworthiness of the management of corporations.36 Indeed, as 
Keay explained, despite the value of fairness associated with stakeholder 
theory, questions remain regarding the practicality and transparency 
surrounding its implementation.37 Marc A. Greendorfer has recently 
 
26 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder 
Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 46–47 (1991) (“The nonshareholder 
constituency statutes, also called stakeholder statutes . . . create fiduciary duties on the part 
of corporate directors toward stakeholders other than shareholders.”). 
27 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. 
REV. 971, 971 (1992).  
28 Id. at 972. 
29 Id. at 972–73. 
30 Id. at 973. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 974. 
33 Id. at 974–75.  
34 Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has it Got What it Takes?, 9 RICH. 
J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 251–52 (2010). 
35 Id. at 298. 
36 Id. at 285, 299. 
37 Id. at 299. 
           Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [Nov. 2020 
 
   
 
84 
argued that a traditional corporation will have to convert to a benefit 
corporation in order to implement a stakeholder theory model.38  
 
C. The Accountable Capitalism Act 
 
Prior to the proposal of the Accountable Capitalism Act, legal 
scholars also proposed other models based on stakeholder theory. For 
example, Edward S. Adams and John H. Matheson proposed that “the best 
solution is to simply offer a choice to corporations . . . by enacting an opt-out 
statute,” which “create[s] a default rule that makes consideration of 
nonshareholder interests mandatory upon incorporation, but allows 
shareholders to amend the articles to favor themselves if they so choose.”39 
On top of that, the newly proposed Accountable Capitalism Act aims 
to create actual motivations for directors to take into account the interests of 
nonshareholder stakeholders by including these stakeholders into 
corporations’ voting systems.40 In his article, Brett McDonnell observed that 
directors are not currently motivated by non-shareholder stakeholders’ needs 
despite their awareness of these needs.41 He therefore argued that this 
approach could change directors’ behavior by creating new incentives.42 
Specifically, the Act would create a new category of employee directors, who 
would, at least in theory, be motivated by their own interests.43 Furthermore, 
because of the need to solicit stakeholder votes, even those non-employee 
directors would have a reason to consider their interests.44 McDonnell did 
point out, however, that different groups of stakeholders may benefit to 
different degrees from the Accountable Capitalism Act.45 Compared to other 
stakeholder groups, such as the environment or consumers, it is easier for 
employees to vote collectively; the proposed Act therefore gives them a 
stronger bargaining chip and more sway in the voting process.46  
Marleen A. O’Connor similarly argued, when she wrote about the 
German codetermination system, that giving employees more power in the 
 
38 Marc A. Greendorfer, Discrimination as a Business Policy: The Misuse and Abuse of 
Corporate Social Responsibility Programs, 8 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 307, 351 (2020). 
39 Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency 
Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1086 (2000). 
40 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018).  
41 Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social 
Enterprise, 70 ALA. L. REV. 77, 102 (2018). 
42 Id. 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 103–04. 
46 Id.  




voting system “restrains opportunistic conduct” by holding directors 






To provide an example of how participatory simulations may be used 
to understand complex social institutions, the research team developed a 
participatory simulation relating to US corporate law. In particular, this 
simulation sought to compare Delaware corporate law to the Accountable 
Capitalism Act.49 This simulation focused on two particular elements of the 
Act, one involving requirements that large corporations (greater than $1 
billion annual gross receipts) have at least two-fifths of the corporation’s 
directors selected by employees rather than shareholders, and the other 
requiring those directors to consider the effects of the corporation’s actions on 
a variety of stakeholders.  
 
1. Simulation structure 
 
The structure of the participatory simulation is as follows. First, 
participants visit a website where they are shown a tutorial. The tutorial 
teaches them about the role of corporate directors, assigns them to be a 
particular type of director (a shareholder-selected director (SSD), employee-
selected director (EmSD), or environment-selected director (EnSD), and 
provides a summarized version of the relevant legal framework (Delaware 
corporate law (Del) or Accountable Capitalism Act (ACA). Next, the tutorial 
introduces the major visual elements of the simulation—the participant’s 
corporation (represented by a factory icon with a share price above it, which 
reflects benefits to shareholders)50 as well as four competitor corporations; 
250 employees (represented by small faces that may be smiling, neutral, or 
frowning, representing the benefits to the employees); 250 employee houses; 
and the background of the world, which varies from green to brown based on 
the level of pollution at each location (reflecting benefits to the environment). 
 
 
47 Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to 
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 937 (1993). 
48 Portions of this paper are adapted from an earlier conference publication: Tomlinson et al., 
Participatory Simulation, supra note 3. 
49 All code for this system is open source and available at https://github.com/wmt-at-ics-uci-
edu/corporate-simulation [https://perma.cc/FYG3-KURB]. 
50 See infra Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The simulated world, with five corporations, 250 workers, and an 
environment-based background. 
 
Next, the simulation begins, and participants are shown 
approximately six seconds of the visualization unfolding, followed by a 
popup asking them to make a decision about how the corporation should 
act.51 The popup presents a brief summary of their job as director and the law 
that applies to them, and asks them to choose between two possible choices 
that are represented by charts showing how much each of three stakeholder 
groups (shareholders, employees, and environment) would benefit from 
either choice. After each choice, the share price of their corporation is 
updated based on the value that was in the “Shareholder Benefit” column of 
their selected choice, the happiness of the employees who work at the 
corporation is updated based on “Employee Benefit,” and the level of 
pollution around the corporation is updated based on “Environmental 
Benefit.” In the current simulation, there are no interactions across the three 
stakeholder groups. For example, low environmental quality does not impact 
employees living in those regions, and low employee well-being does not 
impact share price. In future versions of this simulation, we plan to have more 
complex relationships among income, environmental quality, and other 
factors, as well as a more engaging experience for participants.52 Once 
 
51 See infra Figure 2. 
52 KATHERINE ISBISTER, BETTER GAME CHARACTERS BY DESIGN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
APPROACH xix–xx (2006). See generally Bonnie Nardi, Celia Pearce & Jason Ellis, 
 




participants make their choice, the visualization continues, demonstrating the 
effects of their decision. After twelve rounds of decision-followed-by-
visualization, the decision cycle ends, and participants are asked to answer 
several open-ended questions about their experience. 
 
Figure 2: One of twelve decisions that each participant was asked to make. 
 
2. The law 
 
In the tutorial and on each decision popup, there is a brief summary 
of salient elements of the relevant legal framework. For ease of 
understanding, the legal text for each framework was reduced to a summary 
of fewer than 100 words. These summarizations were done in collaboration 
with a law professor to ensure that the legal meaning was preserved. In doing 
so, they were adapted slightly, to preserve their meaning as much as possible. 
Delaware corporate law53 is summarized as follows in the instructions 
given to the participants in the Delaware condition: 
Directors owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty and duty of care to 
the corporation and its shareholders. Directors must act in 
good faith to advance the best interests of the corporation. The 
corporation may undertake any lawful business by any lawful 
means. Directors must exercise good-faith efforts to ensure 
 
Productive Play: Beyond Binaries, 2 ARTIFACT 60, 62 (2008) (discussing the idea of 
“productive play” and virtual environments). 
53 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (2020). 
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that the corporation complies with laws applicable to its 
operations (such as environmental, labor, and criminal laws). 
Directors are prohibited from using their positions to advance 
their own personal interests.54  
The text explaining the Accountable Capitalism Act55 that is 
presented to ACA participants reads as follows: 
Directors shall manage the corporation in a way that balances 
the financial interests of its shareholders with the best interests 
of persons that are materially affected by the conduct of the 
corporation. In doing so, directors shall consider the effects of 
any action or inaction on the shareholders of the corporation; 
the employees of the corporation; and the environment. 
Directors shall not be required to give priority to a particular 
interest or factor [for example, shareholders, employees, or 




After clicking through each slide of the tutorial, the primary mode of 
interaction for participants involves a series of decisions between two 
choices, each represented by a bar chart. Each chart has one bar showing 
shareholder benefit, one bar for employee benefit, and one bar for 
environmental benefit.56 The value of all three bars in any given chart always 
sums to 1.0. Hence, there is an inherent trade-off between the three 
stakeholder groups. While this is not an accurate representation of the real 
world, where there is not always a zero-sum game among different 
stakeholders, and all possible actions do not have the same total “value,” we 
chose to represent decisions in this way in order to force hard choices on the 
participants and more effectively identify the relative values of different 
stakeholder groups for participants in each condition.  
Every player is given the same set of decisions between two charts; 
however, we randomize both the order in which the decisions are delivered, 
as well as the order of the choices in each decision are presented, thereby 
avoiding order effects in both cases. 
There are several main types of decisions.  
● There are three “balance” decisions, each of which asks participants to 
choose between a strongly polarized chart, e.g., (1.0, 0.0, 0.0) favoring 
one of the three stakeholders vs. a balanced chart (0.34, 0.33, 0.33).  
 
54 Tomlinson et al., Accountability, supra note 3.  
55 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong.  
56 See supra Figure 2. 




● There are three “forced choice” decisions, one between each pair of 
the three stakeholders: shareholders vs. employees, shareholders vs. 
environment, and employees vs. environment. In each of these forced 
choices, the chart for one choice has 0.8 for one stakeholder and 0.1 
for each of the other two, e.g. (0.8, 0.1, 0.1); the chart for the other 
choice has 0.8 for a different stakeholder and 0.1 for the other two, 
e.g. (0.1, 0.8, 0.1).  
● There are also six other decisions, three of the form (0.5, 0.5, 0.0) vs. 
(0.5, 0.0, 0.5), and three of the form (0.5, 0.25, 0.25) vs (0.33, 0.33, 
0.33). 
All quantitative analyses summarized in this paper are based on the 
three “forced choice” and the three “balance” decisions. 
 
4. End of game questions 
 
After completing all twelve decisions, participants are asked several 
open-ended questions aimed at exploring participants’ decision-making and 
understanding of the simulation. Participants are required to write at least 100 
characters in response to each question. In addition, the study includes several 
questions gathering demographic data involving country of residence, age, 
and gender. Gender is collected in line with best practices established in 






This study had two main hypotheses regarding the motivations of 
participants across the various conditions: 
• H1: Participants in all conditions will experience a range of 
motivations that influence their behavior, some of which may be in 
conflict. 
• H2: The legal frameworks through which participants are instructed 
will influence which motivations are most salient in their decision 
processes. 
 
57 Katta Spiel, Oliver L. Haimson & Danielle Lottridge, How to Do Better with Gender on 
Surveys: A Guide for HCI Researchers, INTERACTIONS, July–Aug. 2019, at 62, 63–64. 
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To investigate these hypotheses, we conducted a series of experiments 
using human participants recruited via the Amazon Mechanical Turk58 
crowdsourcing platform (hereafter “AMT”). 
 
2. Qualifying quiz 
 
To ensure that participants had read and understood the relevant law, 
the team deployed a short qualifying quiz through the AMT interface, where 
AMT workers were asked to read the summary of the Accountable 
Capitalism Act or Delaware corporate law and answer a few (relatively 
simple) questions about what they had read, as a preliminary task. For 
example, participants were asked “Which of the following elements are 
directors required to balance under the laws described above (select all that 
apply)?” with three answers derived directly from the text and two plausible-
but-fake answers. AMT workers who earned a perfect score were then invited 
back for the actual experiment. The purpose behind this process was to ensure 
the competence of the AMT workers and ensure high-quality work. 
 
3. Fair payment/treatment 
 
To determine the appropriate rate of pay for the final study, we drew 
on research by Silberman et al.59 We wanted to ensure that the rate of pay 
came out to US$15 per hour. To establish concretely how long the study 
would take, we recorded a time stamp when participants clicked the first slide 
of the tutorial, and another one when they submitted the demographics. We 
also added several minutes to provide time for AMT workers to take the brief 
quiz in AMT. We identified the average time to be approximately 17.6 
minutes, so we set the pay at $4.40 for completion of the task. Results from 
the AMT workers’ free response questions validated that the rate of pay was 
reasonable, including quotes such as the following:  
● “I thought it was a very good experiment and the pay was very good. 
Thanks.” 60 
● “I also felt compensation was fair when compared to other tasks on 
MTURK.” 
 
58 This system’s name is unfortunate, especially in light of the history explored by Ayhan 
Aytes, Return of the Crowds: Mechanical Turk and Neoliberal States of Exception, in DIGITAL 
LAB.: THE INTERNET AS PLAYGROUND AND FACTORY 150, 153–57 (2013). We include the full 
name here for clarity but refer to the system as AMT elsewhere throughout the paper. 
59 See generally M. S. Silberman et al., Responsible Research with Crowds: Pay 
Crowdworkers at Least Minimum Wage, 61 COMM. ACM 40–41 (2018) (discussing 
“crowdsourcing,” “crowdwork,” and appropriate wages for crowdworkers).  
60 Study data on file with authors. Some quotations have been very lightly edited for spelling 
and grammar. 




● “Thanks for the generous hit! It pays very well for the time needed.” 
In addition, to ensure fair treatment of the AMT workers and prompt 
resolution of any possible technical issues or procedural questions, we 
responded to all queries as soon as possible, and we believe we were able to 
resolve all issues to the satisfaction of the AMT workers who contacted us. 
 
4. Pilot studies 
 
We conducted three pilot studies to refine the experimental 
procedures. In line with best practices established in the human-computer 
interaction literature, for example by Kittur et al.,61 we sought to make the 
Human Intelligence Task (HIT) as easy to do correctly as it would be to do it 
at random. In the first pilot, the qualifying quiz was deployed as a separate 
HIT from the main study. However, when we deployed the actual experiment 
to the AMT workers who had succeeded on the qualifying quiz, we found 
that very few of those AMT workers participated in the second HIT. We had 
set the pilot study’s level of pay at a rate that was aiming for (and later 
confirmed to be) at least USD $15 per hour, which is a relatively high pay 
rate for AMT, so we decided that it must be the structure of the qualifying 
quiz, followed by a time lag, followed by the actual experiment, that was 
causing the low turnout. In the second and third pilot studies, we instead 
implemented both the quiz and the actual experiment in the same HIT (the 
quiz in AMT, followed by a link out to the simulation website), deciding that 
we would simply discard the data from those who received less than a perfect 
score. Over the course of these pilots, we revised various aspects of the legal 
wording and interface design.  
 
5. Runs conducted 
 
To assess the hypotheses described above, we deployed four 
experimental conditions, with 100 participants in each. 
● Shareholder-Selected Directors instructed via Delaware corporate 
law (SSD/Del) 
● Shareholder-Selected Directors instructed via the Accountable 
Capitalism Act (SSD/ACA) 
● Employee-Selected Directors instructed via the Accountable 
Capitalism Act (EmSD/ACA) 
● Environment-Selected Directors instructed via the Accountable 
Capitalism Act (EnSD/ACA) 
 
61 E.g., Aniket Kittur, Ed H. Chi & Bongwon Suh, Crowdsourcing User Studies with 
Mechanical Turk, CHI PROC. 453, 455–56 (2008) (discussing the micro-task model for 
gathering input from users).  
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6. Excluded data 
 
The study team excluded two subsets of the data collected from this 
analysis. First, as described above, participants who scored less than 100% 
on the initial quiz were excluded. We discarded their data to ensure that 
participants had read and understood the law in question. Second, several 
participants did not write original content in their end-of-game questions as 
requested, but rather pasted blocks of text from various Internet articles or 
copied other participants; since these participants were not engaging in good 
faith, all of their data were excluded. Some individuals fell into both excluded 
categories (e.g., poor performers on the quiz, as well as copiers of Internet 
content). In total, after these exclusions, data from 345 participants were 
included in the study. 
 
C. Qualitative Coding 
 
To investigate the motivations experienced by participants across the 
various experimental conditions, two members of the research team 
conducted qualitative coding of participants’ responses to the following 
open-ended survey question: “Please describe how you made your decisions. 
What factors did you consider when choosing between the two possibilities?” 
In the first cycle of coding, data were coded inductively to generate 
an initial codebook of descriptive and in vivo codes. The members of the 
research team then met to discuss, define codes, and refine the initial 
codebook. The coders then returned to the data and re-coded using the refined 
codebook. In the second cycle of coding, the research team compared across 
the coded data to identify patterns and points of discontinuity in participants’ 
responses and to generate thematic categories.  
 




We collected demographics about the study population in line with 
best practices described above. The average age of participants included in 
the analysis was 38.6 years. This is significantly younger than the average 
age of many directors (62 years).62 Of the participants, 57% were men, 42% 
 
62 Annalisa Barrett & Jon Lukomnik, Age Diversity Within Boards of Directors of the S&P 
500 Companies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 6, 2017), https://corpgov. 
law.harvard.edu/2017/04/06/age-diversity-within-boards-of-directors-of-the-sp-500-companies/ 
[https://perma.cc/35X6-938Q]. 




women, 0.3% non-binary, and 0.3% preferred not to describe their gender. 
This is a bit more balanced than the 79% of men and 21% of women on 
corporate boards of directors.63 (Non-binary people are not mentioned in the 
data available to us on gender representation on corporate boards.64) With 
regard to country of residence, 89% of participants were from the US, 10% 
from India, and the remainder from other countries (one participant listed each 
from Italy, New Caledonia, Thailand, and South Africa). For uniformity, all 





Previous studies conducted using this experimental platform have 
documented an array of quantitative findings about how participants acted under 
various conditions. Here, we present a summary of the most relevant previous 
findings to provide a base on which the novel qualitative findings then build.  
There are two core groups of quantitative findings that are germane 
to the novel findings in this paper. The first set of findings related to how 
participants in various conditions behaved when given the choice between a 
balanced option and one that favored a particular stakeholder group. 
Participants across all conditions favored balance over any one stakeholder 
group.65 This was true whether the participant was instructed by Delaware 
corporate law (SSD/Del) or the Accountable Capitalism Act (SSD/ACA, 
EmSD/ACA, EnSD/ACA), and it was true whether the participant was 
assigned as a shareholder-selected, employee-selected, or environment-
selected director. And in all of those cases, it was true whether the stakeholder 
group that stood to benefit from the unbalanced choice was shareholders, 
employees, or the environment.  
 
 
63 2020 Women on Boards, GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX, 2018, at 4. 
64 Id. at 2–8.  
65 Tomlinson et al., Participatory Simulation, supra note 3, at 7; Tomlinson et al., 
Accountability, supra note 3 Tomlinson et al., supra note 2, at 5–6. See infra Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: This chart illustrates findings regarding the degree to which 
participants chose biased options vs. balanced options, across all stakeholder 
groups. All but one of these columns show a very strong preference for 
balance, with only 9.9-22.5% of participants choosing the option biased 
toward a particular stakeholder group. The sole column higher than the others 
shows that shareholder-selected directors instructed via Delaware corporate 
law (SSD/Del) still slightly favored balance over a bias in favor of 
shareholders, but were more likely to pick that option than other 
combinations of directors and stakeholders. It is still less than 50% though, 
so the SSD/Del participants still favored balance, if only weakly. We 
performed statistical comparisons between the three pairs of columns for the 
two SSD conditions (Delaware corporate law and the Accountable 
Capitalism Act), and found a statistically significant difference between their 
behaviors in the context of shareholders.66 
 
Eleven of the twelve instances (four conditions times three stakeholder 
groups), including all the ACA conditions, strongly favored balance, opting for 
the choice that favored a particular stakeholder group only 9.9-22.5% of the 
time (p<0.00001** in all eleven instances).67 The only scenario that favored 
balance only weakly was SSD/Del (43%, p = 0.18), and that was when the 
stakeholder group that stood to benefit was the shareholders.68 
There was a statistically significant difference between the behavior 
of shareholder-selected directors under Delaware corporate law and 
 
66 Data adapted from previously published work. Tomlinson et al., Participatory Simulation, 
supra note 3, at 7–8; Tomlinson et al., Accountability, supra note 3; Tomlinson et al., supra 
note 2, at 5–7. 
67 Tomlinson et al., Participatory Simulation, supra note 3, at 7; Tomlinson et al., 
Accountability, supra note 3; Tomlinson et al., supra note 2, at 6. 
68 Tomlinson et al., Accountability, supra note 3. 




shareholder-selected directors under the Accountable Capitalism Act. While 
the Accountable Capitalism Act explicitly mentions balance as a goal, those 
in the Delaware condition had not been told to balance. They had been told 
they had a fiduciary duty to shareholders. And yet, while the effect of the law 
led to a statistically significant difference in behavior (43% vs. 22.5%, 
p=0.0032*),69 those in the Delaware condition still sought balance, even in 
the face of explicitly stated law to the contrary. In the presence of a law 
encouraging balance, participants across all conditions sought balance 
strongly. But even in the presence of a law pushing back against balance, 
participants still exhibited a slight preference for balanced options. 
 
 
Figure 4: This chart illustrates quantitative findings regarding how 
participants in various conditions exhibited preference between the 
stakeholder group that selected them and other stakeholder groups, when 
forced to choose between them. SSD/Del, SSD/ACA, and EmSD/ACA all 
exhibited statistically significant preferences for the stakeholder group that 
selected them, when data from the two non-selecting stakeholder groups were 
combined (green columns). However, EnSD/ACA participants did not 
exhibit this preference. There was a statistically significant difference 
between the EnSD/ACA combined preference and either of the SSD/ACA or 
EmSD/ACA combined values. Data adapted from previously published 
work.70 
 
The second major set of findings related to how participants behaved 
when forced to choose between the stakeholder group that selected them and 
particular other stakeholder groups. Results found that SSD/Del, SSD/ACA, 
 
69 Id. 
70 Tomlinson et al., Participatory Simulation, supra note 3, at 7–8; Tomlinson et al., 
Accountability, supra note 3; Tomlinson et al., supra note 2, at 5–7. 
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and EmSD/ACA participants all tended to favor their own group over other 
stakeholder groups (statistically significant in seven out of nine instances, and 
highly so in one).71 However, EnSD/ACA participants did not exhibit such a 
preference, a difference in behavior that is statistically different from all other 
participant groups (vs. SSD/ACA: 61.8% vs. 48.8%, p=0.015*; vs. 





The core contribution of this article builds on the previously published 
quantitative results, summarized above, to investigate why the participants 
behaved the way they did. Were they seeking to obey the law? Did they feel like 
they owed a debt to the stakeholder group that selected them? Did different 
conditions lead to different motivations being most salient in participants’ 
minds? Qualitative analysis of the comments participants wrote at the end of 
their interactions provide us with insight into the reasons behind their behaviors. 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, that participants in all conditions will 
experience a range of motivations that influence their behavior, some of 
which may be in conflict, we identified five major and two minor motivations 
underlying the behavior of participants assigned to be various kinds of 
directors. The five major motivations included a desire for balance 
(“Balance”), a pre-existing bias in favor of or against particular stakeholder 
groups (“Bias”), an inclination to adjust their behavior to respond to changes 
perceived in the simulated world (“Responsiveness”), a feeling of obligation 
toward the stakeholder group that selected them (“Obligation”), and a desire to 
obey the law (“Law”). The two minor motivations were an indirect motivation 
to support a stakeholder group due to its perceived effect on some other 
stakeholder group (“Interdependencies”), and a desire to support particular 
stakeholder groups strongly at the expense of others (“Anti-balance”).  
Regarding Hypothesis 2, that the legal frameworks through which 
participants are instructed will influence which motivations are most salient 
in their decision processes, we found that, while the frameworks did lead to 
variability in two motivations, the level of all other motivations was 
statistically similar. For the two that varied, we identified a potential 
explanation that accounts for the variation. 
Here we present the specific findings from the qualitative coding of 
the comments participants made at the end of the simulation. In addition to 
recording instances of each of the codes in the dataset, we also identified 
comments that participants made that were ambiguous between two or more 
 
71 Tomlinson et al., Participatory Simulation, supra note 3, at 7; Tomlinson et al., 
Accountability, supra note 3; Tomlinson et al., supra note 2, at 6; see supra Figure 4.  




codes. The nature of the various experimental conditions made certain 
ambiguities present themselves in particular subsets of the study. For 
example, since the law for the ACA conditions mandated that participants 
engage in balance, when ACA participants spoke of balance it was frequently 
impossible to disambiguate between the “Balance” and “Law” codes. 
Nevertheless, in the Discussions section below, we present some arguments 
for how best to understand these ambiguous codes. Table 1 presents counts 
of each motivation for each condition, as well as data for ambiguous codes. 













Balance 42 56 52 54 
Bias 34 29 41 34 
Responsiveness 22 17 17 18 
Obligation 12 9 10 13 
Law 21 5 10 4 
Interdependencies 12 7 3 6 
Anti-balance 1 4 2 2 
Bias/Obligation 0 16 13 8 
Bias/Obligation/Law 16 0 0 0 
Table 1: Raw data presenting the counts of each type of motivation within 
the free-text responses by participants. There were 89 participants in the 
SSD/Del condition, 86 in SSD/ACA, 90 in EmSD/ACA, and 80 in 
EnSD/ACA. The sum of each column is greater than the number of 
participants in that condition because some participants’ responses had 
content matching two or more codes. 
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Figure 5: Frequency of each motivation in the free-text comments, adjusted 
from the raw data above. Specifically, a subset of “Balance” responses for all 
three ACA conditions were moved to “Law” (those above the level of 
“Balance” expressed by Delaware participants), and all ambiguous codes (e.g., 




The most prevalent motivation across all conditions, including both 
shareholder-selected directors instructed via Delaware corporate law and all 
three types of directors under the Accountable Capitalism Act, was a desire 
for balance. Balance and related themes (fairness, equality, etc.) were 
explicitly represented in approximately 59% of responses. A subset of these 
responses in the three ACA conditions may be attributable to obedience to 
the law rather than a desire for balance (addressed in more detail in the 
Discussion section below). In the one condition where this conflation did not 
exist (Delaware corporate law), 47% of participants mentioned balance; we 
hypothesize that could be the baseline level for this population, with the 
remainder potentially attributable to obeying the law.72  
Participants described distinct motivating factors and degrees of 
commitment in their quest for balance. Some participants appealed to 
morality/ethics to justify their efforts to achieve balance. For example, a 48-
year-old male, assigned to SSD/Del, wrote:  
 
72 See infra Section III.C.5. 




“I made my decisions based on moral and ethical 
implications as well as following the proper guidelines of 
how a business director would behave; taking into 
consideration what was lawful, fair and just for everybody. I 
made sure that I considered employees, investors and the 
impact on the environment.”73  
This quote demonstrates several of the recurring patterns in the data - 
fairness, justice, and specific egalitarian inclusion of all three stakeholder 
groups. Other participants described a commitment to balance, but with a 
possible slight bias toward shareholders and employees.74 For example, a 55-
year-old female assigned to EmSD/ACA wrote: “I did my best to take all 
aspects into consideration while keeping everything balanced. I made sure 
to keep my shareholders and employees happy while still trying not to destroy 
the environment.” 
Other participants only sought balance when balance was one of the 
choices presented to them but switched to other motivations such as bias (a 
choice favoring a particular group that is not based on the law or obligation) 
when no balanced choice was available. For example, a 60-year-old female 
assigned to SSD/ACA wrote: “I tried to choose the decision that favored all 
three equally, but when it was not equal, I chose shareholders, then 
employees, then environment.” 
Analyses also suggest that participants used a variety of strategies to 
achieve a certain type of balance. For example, some participants used long-
term strategies and sought to extend their efforts to balance impacts across 
multiple decisions. A 42-year-old male, assigned as an EnSD/ACA, wrote: “I 
tried as best as possible to maintain a balance between all three interests. In 
doing so, I kept a running balance of what interests were best looked after 
and which had been neglected, and would need better care in later decisions.” 
Others varied their selection technique across different decisions, 
perhaps interpreting balance liberally rather than strictly—seeking to take all 
factors into consideration, rather than making them exactly equal. A 53-year-
old male assigned to EmSD/ACA wrote:  
When making decisions, I was looking to balance the interests 
of the employees, shareholders and the environment. I thought 
it was important to take care of the organization’s employees, 
so I weighted many of my decisions in a way that benefited the 
employees. However, I also sought to take a balanced 
approach by selecting options that equally benefited all 
stakeholders. 
 
73 Bold formatting added by the authors to many quotes to highlight specific aspects relevant 
to the discussion at hand. The full quote is included in each case for context and completeness. 
74 See infra Part IV for possible alternative reasons for this ordering. 
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SSD/ACA participants made significantly more comments relating to 
balance than SSD/Del, likely due to the fact that the ACA directs people to 
exhibit balance.75 Nevertheless, the abundance of references to balance in the 
SSD/Del condition makes clear that participants seek balance even in the 




A second major motivation identified through this study was various 
forms of bias, defined as giving a particular group preferential treatment for 
reasons other than the law or a sense of obligation to the group of directors 
who elected a participant. Bias was present across all conditions at 
statistically similar levels, present in at least 40% of responses (potentially 
up to 55%, given ambiguous codes). Here we present various types of bias 
we encountered, with instances of each. 
Some participants provided particular stakeholder groups with 
preferential treatment. This behavior occurred across all three stakeholder 
groups. For example, a 59-year-old male assigned to EmSD/ACA wrote: “I 
wanted to at least maintain the share price of 100 while keeping the 
employees happy and the environment came in third.” 
Even though the participant had been appointed to the directorship by 
the employees, he prioritizes share price over employee happiness and both 
of the aforementioned over the environment. In another example, a 35-year-
old female participant assigned to SSD/ACA wrote: “I wanted to make the 
employees the happiest I could first and foremost. They are the backbone 
to the company and without them, the company wouldn’t make it. Then the 
environment was important to me.”  
She relegated the shareholders who selected her as director to the 
background and prioritized employee happiness first and the environment second. 
In a similar example, a 68-year-old female assigned to EmSD/ACA wrote: 
I prioritised [sic] my decisions based on this order: 
environment, employees, shareholders. If the environment is 
unhealthy, people might get sick and die, in which case there 
would be no employees. I’d rather have a clean 
environment with disgruntled employees and upset 
shareholders than risk degradation of our planet. 
This participant chose to privilege the environment, also noting the 
interconnectedness of the environment and human actors.  
Participants also exhibited bias against particular stakeholder groups. 
Their rationales for and attitudes toward this form of bias were distinct. 
 
75 See infra Part IV. 




Sometimes bias against a stakeholder took the form of passive neglect, as in 
the case of this 33-year-old male assigned to SSD/ACA:  
In this simulation, I looked to try and strike a good balance 
between shareholder interests, and environmental interest. 
That is to say, I prioritized shareholders and environment 
equally whenever possible, and I passively neglected my 
employees completely. I did not factor the interest, or lack of 
interest in my employees into any one of the decisions I made. 
They were not a consideration for me in this simulation.  
Other times, biases involved active rejection of particular stakeholder 
groups, such as this 31-year-old male US resident, assigned to EmSD/ACA: 
“I mostly prioritized employee benefit and environmental benefit. I tried to 
strike a bit of a balance with shareholder benefit, but they were my last 
priority. Eat the rich.”  
Thus, the participant exhibits a clear anti-preference for shareholders 
that is grounded in perceived differences in socioeconomic status between 
shareholders and workers. Similarly, this 33-year-old male US resident, 
assigned to EnSD/ACA, took the inverse position:  
I wanted to give the environment the most sway while making 
my decisions because I was appointed to my job by a group of 
environmental scientists so I felt that I owed it to them to take 
care of the environment. But I couldn’t completely overlook 
the shareholders in order to take care of the environment, so I 
had to take them into account in every decision. I wasn’t 
overly concerned with the employees as I knew they would 
continue to work whether they were happy or unhappy. 
This participant also indirectly references perceived socioeconomic 
differences by noting that employee happiness is not a consideration, as they 
will continue to work out of obligation and presumably financial need.  
Note that this participant also felt a strong sense of obligation to the 
group that appointed him director, as evidenced in the first sentence. 
Frequently, multiple motivations co-existed within one individual’s approach 
to directorship. 
Bias against the environment ranged from callously indifferent to 
almost regretful. For example, a 43-year-old female assigned to SSD/Del 
wrote: “I put the shareholder benefit first and the employee benefit distant 
second because they’re the ones that have the biggest effect on my position. 
environment [sic] was last because I assume someone else will clean it up.” 
Alternatively, a 48-year-old female participant, assigned as 
EmSD/ACA, wrote:  
The easiest ones were those that were equally balanced 
between shareholders, employees, and the environment, but if 
one group had zero shares I always chose the shareholders or 
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the employees over the environment, you can’t answer 
directly to the environment because it has zero votes. 
This quote appears to suggest a preference for making decisions that 
minimize direct face-to-face accountability to human actors. In the interactive 
simulation, participants are told that “[t]here may be other directors on the 
board of directors as well, potentially representing other stakeholders.” While 
another condition in this experiment explicitly involved “environment-
selected directors”, in this participant’s case (where she was assigned to act 
as an employee-selected director), it was never explicitly specified whether 
the environment had representation on the corporate board. However, since 
no corporate board anywhere in the world that we are aware of has 
environment-selected directors, her assumption that the environment has zero 
votes is a reasonable one.  
Many responses coded as bias clearly arise from people’s lived 
experiences outside the simulated business world. For example, a 31-year-
old male assigned to EnSD wrote:  
“For my decisions I took all factors into consideration. I 
considered shareholders, employees and environment. If each 
round had a decision that was equal for all three I would have 
picked that every time. Unfortunately that wasn’t the case and 
I had to make some sacrifices but I tried to even it out through 
all the rounds in the future. But I think my main focus was on 
benefiting the environment because that is how I would act 
in real life.” 
However, it is important to note that it was not always possible to 
distinguish between bias grounded in participants’ lived experiences and bias 
aligned with obligations or the law, and these instances of bias were coded as 




A third major motivation was responsiveness to events unfolding in 
the simulated business world in which they were embedded. This motivation 
was present across all conditions at statistically similar levels, occurring in 
approximately 21% of responses. 
To offer an instance of this motivation, a 41-year-old female assigned 
to EmSD/ACA wrote:  
“I was trying to make my employees happy, but then I 
noticed that the environment was doing poorly, so I 
adjusted that in my next decision. I noticed some employees 
were unhappy, but they never were happy even after I gave 
them more resources. At one point, I thought they might be 




upset because the shareholders weren’t getting any attention 
so I tried giving more to them, but that didn’t work either.” 
Responsiveness to factors beyond just their own company’s stock 
price, employees, and local environment also factored into participants’ 
decisions. For example, a 38-year-old male assigned to EmSD/ACA wrote:  
“I tried to choose the decision that was most evenly weighted 
between the three options. If there were only two weights, I 
choose the one that benefited the shareholders the most, or that 
benefited the employees the most. I noticed that the other 
factories had pollution worse than mine, so in general I 
didn’t judge the decisions using the environmental factor 




The fourth major motivation we identified was a feeling of obligation 
toward the stakeholder group that each participant was told had selected 
them. At least 12% of participants explicitly identified feelings of obligation 
or similar topics as among their motivations. Given the fact that both 
ambiguous codes also included obligation, there is the possibility that 
significantly more participants were motivated by obligation. This motivation 
was present at statistically similar levels across all four conditions. 
This obligation manifested in various forms. Some individuals felt a 
sense of indebtedness to the group that selected them, such as this 36-year-
old male assigned to EnSD/ACA:  
“First and foremost, I put the environment at the top of the list 
of things I cared about. The scientific community put me in 
charge here and I owed it to them to keep the environment 
as clean as possible, while still trying to keep the company 
competitive and employees happy.” 
Others, such as the 47-year-old female assigned to SSD/ACA, 
appeared to fear repercussions from not satisfying that group (even though 
no such functionality was included in the simulation or conveyed to 
participants):  
“I kept in mind that while I wanted to be environmentally 
responsible and keep the employees happy, I was elected by 
the shareholders who really control the company. If they don’t 
like my decisions, I can be fired. I often chose the option where 
all three categories were equal. When the ground got more 
polluted, I favored the environment. Now that I think about it, 
once the ground is polluted, it’s more difficult to go back.” 
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The fifth major motivation we identified was a desire to uphold the 
law. It was present across all conditions. While this motivation was only 
explicitly stated by approximately 12% of participants, we believe that the 
actual representation of this motivation may have been significantly higher. 
Explicit references to the law were significantly higher in the SSD/Del 
condition than the SSD/ACA condition (p=.00094**). As mentioned earlier, 
“balance” was an important part of the law for participants in the three 
Accountable Capitalism Act conditions; as such, we hypothesize that 
numerous participants in those conditions may have been commenting on 
their desire to uphold the law either by explicitly stating it or by stating their 
effort to produce balanced outcomes. 
A 41-year-old male SSD/Del provides an instance of obedience to the 
law: “My decisions were mostly directed by my fiduciary responsibility to 
ensure that the shareholders received the best outcome.” 
In addition, multiple ACA participants explicitly connected 
balance/equality to the stated law. For example, a 40-year-old female 
EnSD/ACA wrote: “I tried to choose options that were the most equal so I 
would adhere to the law. In cases where there were no equal options, I tried 





Two other motivations were present at low levels across all 
conditions. The first of these, “Interdependencies”, was similar to bias, but 
involved actions taken regarding one stakeholder group because of the 
indirect effects of that action on other stakeholder groups. 
For example, a 40-year-old female EnSD/ACA wrote: 
“Overall I tried to ensure that each factor was given some 
preferences based on the choices available to me. If it had to 
sacrifice employee benefit, I tried to maximize shareholder 
benefit since that will result in the employees having jobs 
and perhaps better pensions or 401k.” 
Participants perceived a range of interdependencies, none of which 
were an actual part of the simulation. For example, a 59-year-old male 
SSD/Del wrote: 
“I wanted to first make sure the company and shareholders 
took first consideration. Then the employees and lastly the 
environment. I probably should have taken more 
consideration for the environment as I believe that would 




have made for happier employees. I wanted to overall try 
not to make the company go below 100 [share price].” 
Still others, such as this 50-year-old female EmSD/ACA, considered 
the possibility of interdependencies, although she ultimately dismisses this 
possibility based on what she sees in the simulation: 
“I tried to be somewhat fair and choose decisions that would 
at different times benefit different individuals or the 
environment of course. It’s honestly easiest to let the 
environment go at this point as it doesn’t seem to directly 
(at least not yet) have any effect on the mood of my 
employees. I want to be fair to the shareholders as well, but 
since I was chosen by the employees it seems like a good idea 





The final motivation was the flip side of the balance motivation 
identified earlier—a drive toward “anti-balance.” This motivation was 
present at low levels across all conditions.  
This 36-year-old male EnSD provides an example of this 
motivation: “I tried to choose the one option that helped 
with the biggest concern at the time. For example if 
pollution was getting bad I would select the option that had 
the biggest environmental help. Or if employees were getting 
unhappy I would choose the option that had the biggest impact 
on employee satisfaction.” 
Often, anti-balance appeared to be a mechanism for enabling balance 
across longer time horizons, such as in the case of this 41-year-old male 
SSD/ACA:  
“I tried to balance all three factors, while occasionally 
choosing one that would greatly benefit a group that was 
lacking at the time. If I chose one that made the employees 
unhappy, I focused on them next. If the [share] price got too 
low, I chose to focus on the shareholders more on the next 
choice. I think as time went on my choices were more 
reactionary than in the first few rounds.” 
In fact, unbeknownst to the participants, consistent anti-balance was 
actually an effective strategy for achieving balance, since each participant 
was presented with a complete and balanced set of decisions, with every 
stakeholder group being favored in different questions.  
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A. Ambiguous Codes 
 
In the raw data, while SSD/Del participants mentioned balance more 
frequently than any other motivation, they nevertheless mentioned balance 
significantly fewer times than they did any of the ACA conditions. This is 
highly likely because the ACA conditions were instructed to “manage the 
corporation in a way that balances the financial interests of its shareholders 
with the best interests of persons that are materially affected by the conduct 
of the corporation.”76 Therefore, it is highly likely that some of the “balance” 
instances in the ACA conditions were present because people were following 
the law,77 rather than because of an innate drive for balance. 
To provide an instance of this form of ambiguity: a 57-year-old male, 
assigned as SSD/ACA, wrote: “I tried to roughly balance the benefits of the 
shareholders, the employees and the environment over the course of the 
twelve decisions.” 
From his wording, it is unclear whether he did so because he feels that 
shareholders, employees, and the environment should be treated fairly, or 
because he had been instructed to do so by the law in the simulation. 
While we included all participants who mentioned “balance” or 
similar terms in the “Balance” code statistics, we believe it may be possible 
to disambiguate these two effects. The level of balance present in the 
Delaware condition, in which participants were not instructed to balance any 
factors, potentially offers a reasonable baseline for all participants. In the 
statistics in Table 1, the frequency of SSD/ACA “Balance” (56/86, 65%), is 
significantly higher than the SSD/Del “Balance” (42/89, 47%) (p=0.0168*). 
Since the Delaware participants mentioning balance were not doing so 
because of the law, we could potentially assume that same level carried 
through the ACA conditions. We could hypothesize that all mentions of 
balance above that level could be ascribed to following the law rather than a 
desire for balance. Interestingly, the only other significant difference in the 
qualitative dataset between SSD/Del and SSD/ACA is very well matched 
with this hypothesis: while SSD/Del mentioned the law, rules, or similar 
topics 21 times (21/89, 24%), SSD/ACA only mentioned these topics 5 times 
(5/86, 5.8%), a statistically significant difference (p=.00094**). If the surplus 
“Balance” codes from ACA were to move to the “Law” code, the levels of 
all five major motivations would be statistically similar across all conditions.  
There were several other forms of ambiguity that we did not have a 
clear way to disambiguate. For example, for each of the ACA conditions, 
 
76 Tomlinson et al., Participatory Simulation, supra note 3, at 5.  
77 See supra Section III.C.5. 




participants occasionally expressed a preference for one stakeholder group 
over another. When the stakeholder group they preferred was not the 
stakeholder group who selected them, it was a clear case of bias, and was 
coded as such. However, when the participant expressed a preference for the 
stakeholder group that selected them (e.g., an EmSD/ACA expressing a 
preference for employees), it was ambiguous whether they were doing so 
because they had a bias in favor of employees, or felt an obligation toward 
the stakeholder group that selected them. Such cases were coded as 
“Bias/Obligation.” As an example of this case, a 29-year-old male assigned 
to EmSD/ACA wrote: “I wanted to try to keep employees happy and make 
as much money as I could by improving the stock price. Unfortunately the 
environment was the one to suffer, but it seemed that way with most of the 
other businesses as well.” 
Similarly, in the Delaware case (in which all participants were 
assigned as shareholder-selected directors), participants who expressed a 
preference for shareholders may have done so due to bias, due to having been 
selected by shareholders, or due to the law telling them that they have a 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders. As such, those cases were coded as 
“Bias/Obligation/Law.” For example, a 47-year-old male assigned to 
SSD/Del wrote: “I put the most weight on benefit to the 
shareholders.However, [sic] when possible I applied it as equally as possible 
across employees and environment to balance out the effects to workers and 
environment which would eventually affect our shareholders by hurting our 
business.” He is clearly favoring shareholders, but the motivation for doing 
so is unclear. 
 
B. Quantitative and Qualitative 
 
The qualitative results shed significant light on the motivations 
underlying the behaviors that the participants exhibited. For example, the 
motivation to seek balance was present in both the quantitative and 
qualitative results. So too was obedience to the law. And feelings of 
obligation toward the stakeholder group that selected the director, which were 
clearly present in the quantitative results for participants in the SSD/ACA and 
EmSD/ACA conditions (and likely present in SSD/Del as well, although in 
that case law and obligation were conflated), were evident throughout many 
of the comments made by various participants across all four conditions. 
In addition, the qualitative results shed light on some of the “negative 
space” in the quantitative findings. Yes, ACA participants mostly focused on 
achieving balance. But why were they not single-minded in their pursuit of 
balance, choosing the balanced option 100% of the time? The qualitative 
results show that bias, responsiveness, and obligation were likely major 
factors pushing back against balance. 
           Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [Nov. 2020 
 




C. From Simulation to Reality 
 
The goal of balance is present in real world directors. For example, a 
2020 post on the INSEAD Leadership and Organizations blog discussed 
“How should the board balance the interests of various stakeholders?” noting 
that, except in the case of wrongful trading, “the board has the discretion to 
balance various interests.”78 
Bias is a significant factor in the behavior of real-world directors as 
well. As Page writes: “First, directors are likely to have preferences, even 
though they sometimes will not be consciously aware of them. Second, 
regardless of directors’ good faith, unconscious and, to a significant extent, 
uncontrollable cognitive processes will prevent the directors’ decisions from 
being unaffected by their preferences.”79 
As with the previous motivations found in the simulation, 
responsiveness is a factor in the real world as well, albeit in different forms 
from this simulation. While in the simulated business world we made the 
benefit and suffering of various stakeholder groups intentionally explicit 
(e.g., via stock prices rising and falling, employees becoming happy or sad, 
and the ground becoming polluted or green), these phenomena have variable 
levels of explicitness from the point of view of corporate directors. Share 
price is certainly a strong, clear signal to directors regarding the shareholders’ 
wellbeing. However, employee wellbeing is somewhat less evident, visible 
via internal surveys and union strikes rather than by a concrete, agreed-upon 
statistic. Environmental wellbeing is even more difficult to determine, with 
questions of what aspects of the environment are within scope and how to 
measure those factors being critical. Given the old saying that “you can’t 
manage what you can’t measure,” stock price is clearly the easiest factor to 
measure, and therefore potentially to manage. However, others have 
proposed that this old saying is untrue, and that in fact, “the important stuff 
can’t be measured.”80 
In the selection of directors in real business contexts, there are 
presumably two factors in play: first, the idea that particular stakeholder 
groups will select individual directors whom they believe are inherently 
 
78 Jaap Winter & Erik van de Loo, The Role of the Board in Times of Distress, INSEAD 
KNOWLEDGE (2020), https://knowledge.insead.edu/blog/insead-blog/the-role-of-the-board-
in-times-of-distress-13726 [https://perma.cc/S4D5-KW56].  
79 Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 237, 237 (2009). 
80 Liz Ryan, ‘If You Can’t Measure It, You Can’t Manage It’: Not True, FORBES (Feb. 10, 
2014, 12:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizryan/2014/02/10/if-you-cant-measure-it-
you-cant-manage-it-is-bs/#319ed2487b8b [https://perma.cc/8XTS-GMRL].  




sympathetic to the needs of that stakeholder group81, and second, that those 
directors will feel a sense of obligation or loyalty82 toward the stakeholder 
group due to having been selected by them. Ideologically, one would hope 
that the former factor would be the dominant rationale for passing legislation, 
such as the Accountable Capitalism Act, that requires certain fractions of 
directors to be selected by particular stakeholder groups. However, since 
participants in this study were assigned at random to different groups (rather 
than allowed to self-select or being selected based on unique qualifications 
or interests), the research project described here provides experimental 
evidence that the second factor has the potential to exert a powerful influence 
on individuals’ behaviors as well. 
In real business contexts, the law is perhaps the most obvious 
motivator for corporate directors. We find it interesting that obedience to the 
law was cited substantially less frequently than several other motivations 
cited by participants in this study. 
When thinking about novel legislation, in the context of corporate 
directors or other business settings, it is potentially beneficial to consider how 
the legislation engages with the motivations identified in this paper. Is 
balance desirable in the context under consideration, and does the legislation 
strengthen or weaken the drive for balance? Is bias toward or away from 
particular stakeholders desirable? If so, which biases does the legislation 
strengthen? Is the legislation intended to create a sense of obligation? If not, 
how can it be structured to minimize that effect? 
While there are differences between the participants in this study and 
corporate directors in the real world—training, life experiences, the reality of 
impacts of laws and obligations, or the impact of other advisors—these 
motivations are largely human motivations, and are likely present throughout 
business contexts (as the instances identified earlier suggest). Nevertheless, 
it would be instructive to interrogate these differences in greater detail.83 
 
D. Order Effects 
 
We found that many participants listed the three stakeholder groups 
in the same order: shareholders, employees, then environment. While it is 
 
81 See J. D. Westphal & E. J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic 
Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 60 (1995) (proposing that 
CEOs appoint new board members who are demographically similar, and therefore more 
sympathetic to them).  
82 See A. S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 462 
(2009) (noting that director loyalty requires an affirmative devotion to shareholders’ interests). 
 
 
83 See infra Part V. 
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possible this ordering represents the default bias that many participants held, 
we think it is likely that at least some instances of this ordering arose from the 
order in which the stakeholder groups were presented in each chart 
representing a choice. While the interactive system randomized the ordering of 
the 12 decisions, and switched the order of delivery of the two choices in each 
decision (left vs. right in Figure 2), all of the charts representing particular 
decisions presented the data in the same format, with shareholders at left, 
employees in the center, and the environment at right. In addition, the tutorial at 
the beginning of the interaction introduced the three stakeholder groups. 
These design decisions likely impacted the way participants thought 
about the different stakeholder groups, and potentially affected how they 
interacted as a result. Nevertheless, how information is presented is a 
confounding factor across many different contexts, including the real business 
world. The motivations identified in this paper are still likely to be substantial 
factors in the decision-making of the directors of real corporations. 
 
V. FUTURE WORK 
 
There are a number of future directions for this particular study 
context: 
● Conduct the study with real corporate directors (or final year MBA 
students, as a proxy for those with the training and interest to become 
corporate directors) to see if the motivations revealed are consistent 
with those of laypeople. This would be analogous to an earlier study 
of patent systems, comparing effects between first year and third year 
law students.84 In such a study, it would be beneficial to engage 
participants in post-simulation interviews or other methods to take 
full advantage of and learn from their lived experiences. 
● Let participants choose which category of director they belong to 
(e.g., SSD vs. EmSD vs. EnSD), to see how they act when bias and 
obligation are aligned. 
● Implement interdependencies among different stakeholder groups 
(e.g., happy employees increase share price, polluted environment 
decreases employee happiness) to see if it changes participant 
behavior. 
● Implement the ability for directors to be fired from their positions 
based on their performance (as one participant quoted above feared) 
to see if they behave differently. 
● Tell participants the composition of the rest of the board, and see if it 
changes their behavior. For example, would an environment-selected 
 
84Andrew Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patent Expertise and the Regress of Useful Arts, 33 
S. ILL. U. L.J. 239, 241 (2009). 




director who knew they were the sole non-shareholder-selected 
director on the board behave differently from one who was on a board 
composed entirely of other environment-selected directors? 
● Adapt the simulation so that multiple participants are simultaneously 
on the same board of directors, and need to negotiate with each other 
at each decision point. 
These instances point to a range of directions that the existing 
platform could take in more fully exploring this particular legal context. 
More broadly, we see this work as being an instance of a much 
broader class of research within empirical legal studies. Developing 
processes for assessing hypothetical or proposed legislation could be 
exceedingly valuable in understanding the likely impacts that the legislation 
may have. As such, it could allow for experimentation in advance of 
deployment, rather than revision after the fact. Such experimentation has the 
potential to lead to significant improvements in the effectiveness of 
legislation in supporting wellbeing for humans and other species, which, 




Corporate directors wield considerable influence over the behavior of 
corporations. In general, at least within existing models of US corporate law, 
they are obliged to act in the interests of corporation shareholders. 
Interpreting what these interests are can be nuanced, so the law usually 
affords directors discretion and flexibility in acquitting their obligations to 
the shareholders on whose behalf they act. Nevertheless, directors are not 
supposed to put other interests, such as those of workers or the environment, 
above those of shareholders. 
However, through the research described here, we identified 
numerous motivations acting on the behavior of participants assigned to act 
as the directors of corporations, only some of which aligned with the primacy 
of shareholders. While participants were clearly instructed by the law to 
behave in particular ways (some via principles from Delaware corporate law, 
and some via principles from the Accountable Capitalism Act), we found that 
obedience to the law was only one of five major motivations influencing their 
behavior. In addition to obedience to the law, we identified a desire for 
balance, an array of personal biases, a sense of responsiveness to how events 
were unfolding around them, and a feeling of obligation to the stakeholder 
group that selected them as powerful factors in their decision-making. These 
five motivations—balance, bias, responsiveness, obligation, and the law—
worked together in various combinations across different participants to 
determine the actions that directors took on behalf of their corporations.  
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Corporation behavior affects many aspects of society and the 
environment. Employees of corporations spend much of their days, or even 
lives, within the corporate context. Employee health, safety, happiness, and 
economic well-being are often dominated by their employment context. 
Depending on the behavior of a corporation, a worker may experience 
fulfillment, joy, good health, and economic security, or, instead, 
discouragement, depression, illness, and poverty. Similarly, a corporation 
may minimize the pollution it generates, protect biodiversity, and use energy 
and raw materials efficiently, or it may dirty and despoil its surroundings and 
the broader world. Moreover, the interests of, and effects on, employees and 
the environment are not independent of one another. Pollution may generate 
jobs, but simultaneously cause damage to workers’ property and health. 
Higher employee compensation may allow higher standards of material 
living for workers, but may squeeze out corporation spending on pollution 
mitigation. The relationships among the interests of shareholders, workers, 
and the environment are complicated, interdependent, and poorly understood. 
Participants in our simulations appear to have understood this 
complexity. Although this understanding manifests itself in several ways in 
the results, the clearest indication is how often participants reference the need 
for balance in director decision-making. Whether their obligations were 
primarily to favor shareholders, workers, or the environment, the results 
demonstrate a tendency by participants to balance interests - sometimes all 
three simultaneously. Discovering such strong evidence of director balancing 
is a surprising result. The existing literature on director behavior addresses 
balancing of interests largely to the extent of suggesting that the law ought to 
be amended to allow balancing. The need for the law to be amended to allow 
balancing implies that balancing is not supported by the current legal 
framework of director obligations. 
Our results not only indicate a recognition of the need for balancing, 
and a desire to engage in it, they also show that participants in our simulations 
will affirmatively defy the instructions they are given in order to implement 
balancing. The instructions provided to participants in the SSD/Del condition, 
who were tasked with following Delaware corporate law, were clear and 
explicit. They engaged in substantial balancing nevertheless. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. once stated a moral principle that may have relevance for our results. 
In his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Dr. King said, “One has not only a legal 
but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral 
responsibility to disobey unjust laws."85 It may be that the participants playing 
 
85 Martin Luther King, Jr., Reading of “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” April 16, 1963, 
https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/letter-birmingham-jail [https://perm 
a.cc/BVZ9-VVS3] (transcript available at African Studies Center, University of 
 




directors in our simulations believe taking into account the interests of 
workers and the environment is a moral responsibility, despite what existing 
corporate law requires, and that blindly representing the interests of 
shareholders alone would be tantamount to disobeying “unjust laws”. 
There may be a lesson here for corporate law. If it does not explicitly 
allow directors to take into account interests other than shareholders, it may not 
be obeyed faithfully. Laws that citizens refuse to obey tend not to last. Instead, 
our results may suggest that corporate law be amended to allow directors to take 
into account multiple interests. In this way, director behavior may be more 
predictable, providing corporations with more predictability. Furthermore, the 
law may be brought more closely into harmony with strong, and potentially 
socially valuable, instincts of corporate directors, who wish to benefit their 
corporations while benefiting workers, the environment, and perhaps other 
important interests beyond the scope of our experiments. At the very least, our 
simulations have provided an evidentiary basis for director behavior that is 





Pennsylvania, https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html [https:// 
perma.cc/K85A-85LJ]). 
 
